Observed
Portals, roads, a security wall, vehicle activity, excavated spoil, reinforcement and partial backfilling.
VISUAL DOSSIER · IRAN · 15 SEPTEMBER 2026
Pickaxe Mountain: the target lies deeper than the promise
About 1.6 kilometres south of Natanz, Pickaxe Mountain contains two tunnel complexes linked to Iran’s nuclear programme. The larger complex was announced as the replacement for a centrifuge assembly hall destroyed in 2020 and is publicly estimated beneath roughly 80–100 metres of rock. Imagery from July and August 2026 showed the site’s most intense surface activity in its six-year history, but did not demonstrate enrichment inside or a facility ready to operate.
Donald Trump said the United States would “take out” Pickaxe Mountain. A strike might stop at the entrances, disable the site’s functions or reach the underground halls themselves. The page breaks that promise into four testable outcomes: surface damage, access denial, functional disablement and structural destruction.
Status on 15 September 2026: CSIS describes the activity in 9 July and 9 August imagery as the most intense in the site’s six-year history; ISIS says roads to the western portals remained blocked on 11 September. Iran rejects reports of nuclear activity as baseless. No verified source confirms that the facility is operational or that the site has been struck.
1.6 kmsouth of Natanz
80–100 mpublic depth estimate
4visible portals for the new complex
0IAEA visits to the two complexes
WHAT WE KNOW IN THE FIRST 30 SECONDS
A target visible at the surface, an interior built from estimates
The English nickname comes from the local name Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā, commonly rendered as Pickaxe Mountain. The peak stands at roughly 1,608 metres. The new complex has a pair of portals on both its eastern and western sides; the older complex is physically separate. Iran presented the new construction as the replacement for a centrifuge assembly hall destroyed in 2020. Analysts have also raised additional possible uses, including enrichment or protected storage. None has been demonstrated by an inspection inside.
Assessed
Likely depth, hall size, the role of ventilation and the stage of construction.
Unknown
The interior plan, contents, operational status and the real effect of a strike on underground halls.
01 · A MAP FILLED IN OVER SIX YEARS
One mountain, two complexes and infrastructure that became gradually legible from orbit
The schematic preserves the relative positions described in commercial imagery analysis. It does not reproduce an interior plan or draw unseen tunnels. Select a year to see what had become observable at the surface.
orientation schematic · north is at the top
02 · HOW MUCH ROCK IS ABOVE IT?
Three public estimates describe different geometries
The interior has no public map. Estimates use portal elevations, the mountain ridge and the volume of excavated earth. They converge on a very deep site, but do not locate the halls precisely or reveal whether the tunnels rise or descend.
A separate analysis based on excavated spoil piles and Planet Labs imagery estimated a depth of 80–100 m. The method does not reveal the exact shape of underground cavities.
The three values should not be averaged. The first two start from terrain and elevation; the third starts from excavation. All carry substantial uncertainty.
assessed ridge: ~1,590 m
portal elevation
hypothetical hall level
about 80–100 mESTIMARE PUBLICĂ
03 · THE BOMB AND THE MOUNTAIN USE DIFFERENT UNITS
The GBU-57 is America’s heaviest conventional penetrating bomb. Its real performance remains classified
The Air Force describes the Massive Ordnance Penetrator as a 30,000-pound weapon for hard and deeply buried targets. An older public caption says it was designed to penetrate up to 200 feet, about 61 metres, before exploding. That number is not a universal guarantee: rock, concrete, impact angle, fuzing and repeated strikes change the result. Reuters reports that experts assess the Pickaxe complexes as beyond the reliable reach of the most powerful US bunker-busting bombs.
13.6 ttotal mass, approximate
6.25 mlength
2.4 texplosive fill, approximate
61 mold public “up to” figure
Why 61 m versus 80–100 m remains an incomplete comparison
- The weapon figure describes penetration under specific conditions, while operational details are classified.
- The mountain figure describes rock above an estimated position, not necessarily the direct path to a hall.
- A strike can cause shock, local collapse or access denial without the weapon physically reaching the hall.
04 · WHAT DOES “TAKE IT OUT” MEAN IN MILITARY TERMS?
Four thresholds for success. Each leaves a different facility behind and requires different proof
Choose a threshold. The mountain section shows which part of the system is affected, what a satellite could see and how easily the effect could be reversed. A public claim of “destruction” is hard to assess without the threshold being defined.
05 · THE EVIDENCE LEDGER
What is observed, what is assessed and what remains open to speculation
The filters separate visible or declared facts from analytical inference and genuine gaps. The distinction matters because the same image can prove there is a construction site without proving an active enrichment plant.
Two separate complexes
The large complex begun in 2020 and the smaller facility known since 2007 are physically distinct and sit inside the expanded perimeter.
Four portals for the new complex
Imagery shows a pair of entrances on the eastern side and a pair on the western side of the mountain.
Iran announced a centrifuge hall
In September 2020, Iran’s nuclear chief said a larger, more modern hall would be built in the mountain after the surface facility was destroyed.
Surface activity reached a six-year high in 2026
CSIS analysis of 9 July and 9 August imagery describes the most intense activity in the site’s six-year history: improved roads, hardened portals and spoil removal. The analysis does not demonstrate enrichment or operation.
Likely depth exceeds many conventional targets
Public estimates put the facility about 80–100 m deep or in a geometry that may provide even more local rock cover.
An enrichment plant remains possible
The size and protection of the complex could permit functions beyond centrifuge assembly. There is no public confirmation by inspection.
The large complex still appeared non-operational
The September 2026 CSIS assessment describes a clear surge in activity but cannot confirm centrifuge movement or show a facility ready for enrichment.
No public interior plan exists
The position, number and size of halls, tunnel gradients and connections between galleries are not publicly known.
The contents of the smaller complex are unknown
The older tunnels were observed sealed. Any material inside has not been identified publicly.
The uranium stockpile has not been publicly placed at Pickaxe
The IAEA could not verify the location of the full stockpile after the 2025 war. The June 2026 assessment said the large Pickaxe complex was not believed to hold it.
No claim matches the selected filter.
06 · HOW THE MOUNTAIN BECAME A TARGET
A chronology of hardening, distrust and escalation
Pickaxe Mountain began as a response to the vulnerability of a surface hall. Every later episode added physical protection and political uncertainty.
2007
A smaller complex becomes publicly known
Analysts identify older tunnels south of Natanz. Iran does not declare them as a nuclear facility and the IAEA does not inspect them.
02.07.2020
The Natanz explosion destroys the assembly hall
On 2 July, a building used for advanced centrifuge assembly is heavily damaged. Iran later describes the incident as sabotage.
09.2020
Iran moves the successor into the mountain
In September, Ali Akbar Salehi announces a more modern, wider and more comprehensive hall in the mountain near Natanz. Visible work begins that autumn.
2022
The geometry looks larger and deeper
Four entrances to the new complex appear. Elevation analysis suggests protection comparable to or greater than Fordow.
2024
Possible ventilation infrastructure appears
Work on the slope points to a possible ventilation shaft, needed for people, machinery and clean assembly spaces.
04.2025
The mountain gains a double perimeter
Walls, fences and patrol roads extend physical protection and connect the area to Natanz security.
22.06.2025
The US strikes Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan
Operation Midnight Hammer uses 14 GBU-57 bombs against two target areas and Tomahawk missiles against Isfahan. Pickaxe Mountain is not struck.
2026
Summer imagery shows unprecedented activity
CSIS compared imagery from 9 July and 9 August and described the most intense surface activity in the site’s six-year history: hardened portals, improved roads and spoil removal. It could not confirm centrifuge movement or preparation for enrichment.
13.07.2026
Trump promises a strike
On 13 July, the US president says America will “take out” Pickaxe Mountain and suggests an attack is near.
10.09.2026
The IAEA sees movement but cannot see inside
On 10 September, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said in a Bloomberg TV interview that the Agency could see movement at the site through remote imagery, but had no concrete information about activity inside and had not had access for an inspection. The observation adds evidence about visible activity; it does not confirm enrichment, centrifuge movement or an operational complex.
14.09.2026
Iran rejects the reports while access stays limited
On 14 September, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said reports of nuclear activity at Pickaxe were baseless. That same week, ISIS reported that roads to the western portals were still blocked on 11 September. These are different kinds of evidence: an official denial and an observation from imagery.
07 · WHY IT MATTERS EVEN IF THE SITE IS EMPTY
Strategic value comes from future capacity, unverified stocks and the cost of uncertainty
The large complex was not assessed as operational in June 2026. That reduces the case for an immediate threat from inside it, while leaving the broader stakes intact. A nearly finished facility could shelter equipment, production or storage. The absence of IAEA access makes it hard to distinguish defensive preparation from undeclared nuclear activity.
A strike can destroy future capacity
If the halls are empty, the main effect is the loss of hard-to-build infrastructure rather than the interruption of enrichment already under way.
A blocked portal can obstruct verification too
Isolating the interior can delay Iranian operations and also delay inspectors who might establish what survived.
Uncertainty creates pressure for repeated strikes
Without plans, interior sensors or inspections, any vehicle movement can be read as reconstruction. The ambiguity favours escalation and claims that cannot be checked quickly.
Nuclear knowledge is not stored in one mountain
Destroying a facility can remove equipment and delay a programme. Personnel, designs and industrial experience remain distributed.
08 · WHAT TO WATCH AFTER A STRIKE
The first images would show access. Certainty about the interior would arrive much later
These indicators can test public claims without pretending a satellite can see through a mountain.
Portals and roads
Craters, collapse, fresh earth and excavator tracks would show whether access was blocked or reopened.
Power and ventilation
Transformers, power lines, chillers and slope structures indicate whether support functions can return.
Surface deformation
Subsidence, cracking or terrain change can suggest internal collapse. Their absence does not prove the halls are intact.
Activity in the following weeks
Vehicle tempo, rubble removal and new entrances would measure Iran’s ability to recover.
IAEA and radiological data
Iranian notifications, inspector access and radiation monitoring would clarify whether nuclear material was present.
SOURCES AND CLAIM STATUS
Public documents, commercial imagery and explicit limits
Surface facts come mainly from analysis of commercial imagery. Depth and internal functions are estimates. Claims about strike effects remain scenarios until supported by post-strike data, technical information or inspection.
01020304050607080910111213
Reuters · “Trump says the US will take out Pickaxe Mountain in Iran”
13 July 2026 · the statement and immediate context
IAEA · GOV/2026/8, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran
27 February 2026 · access, verification and unverified stocks
Institute for Science and International Security · Comprehensive Imagery Report
10 June 2026 · the status of Natanz, Pickaxe, Fordow and Isfahan
Institute for Science and International Security · New Security Perimeter
23 April 2025 · the two complexes and their perimeter
Institute for Science and International Security · Deeper, Larger than Expected
13 January 2022 · elevations and depth geometry
Associated Press · An Iranian nuclear facility is so deep underground...
22 May 2023 · the 80–100 m excavation-based estimate
U.S. Air Force · Massive Ordnance Penetrator
fact sheet and official photograph · mass, dimensions and public penetration figure
U.S. Department of Defense · Operation Midnight Hammer briefing
22 June 2025 · the use of 14 GBU-57 bombs against two target areas
Reuters · Iran building new production hall for centrifuges
8 September 2020 · Iran’s announcement of a hall in the mountain
CSIS · Satellite Imagery Analysis of Pickaxe Mountain
9 September 2026 · six-year comparison and 2026 activity
ISIS · Imagery Update: Iran Limits Access to Tunnel Entrances at Pickaxe Mountain
14 September 2026 · blocked roads and limited access on 11 September
Reuters · Iran says reports about activity at Pickaxe Mountain are baseless
14 September 2026 · statement by spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei
Dawn / Bloomberg · Rafael Grossi: the IAEA sees movement, not concrete information about the interior
10 September 2026 · Bloomberg TV interview, reported by Dawn · secondary source
Status note: there is no public confirmation of the interior plan, an active enrichment facility or uranium storage in the large Pickaxe complex. Analytical assessments are identified as such. The last-check time appears in the hero because the military situation can change quickly.