PICKAXE / DOSSIER RO

VISUAL DOSSIER · IRAN · 14 JULY 2026

Pickaxe Mountain: the target lies deeper than the promise

About 1.6 kilometres south of Natanz, Pickaxe Mountain contains two tunnel complexes linked to Iran’s nuclear programme. The larger complex was announced as the replacement for a centrifuge assembly hall destroyed in 2020 and is publicly estimated beneath roughly 80–100 metres of rock. Its scale, protection and lack of IAEA access make it important: it could preserve future nuclear capacity even though analysts did not yet consider it operational.

Donald Trump said the United States would “take out” Pickaxe Mountain. A strike might stop at the entrances, disable the site’s functions or reach the underground halls themselves. The page breaks that promise into four testable outcomes: surface damage, access denial, functional disablement and structural destruction.

Status at 11:48 BST on 14 July 2026: Trump had said the United States would strike Pickaxe Mountain “relatively soon”. At that time, no official source or verified news report confirmed an attack on the site.
1.6 kmsouth of Natanz
80–100 mpublic depth estimate
4visible portals for the new complex
0IAEA visits to the two complexes

WHAT WE KNOW IN THE FIRST 30 SECONDS

A target visible at the surface, an interior built from estimates

The English nickname comes from the local name Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā, commonly rendered as Pickaxe Mountain. The peak stands at roughly 1,608 metres. The new complex has a pair of portals on both its eastern and western sides; the older complex is physically separate. Iran presented the new construction as the replacement for a centrifuge assembly hall destroyed in 2020. Analysts have also raised additional possible uses, including enrichment or protected storage. None has been demonstrated by an inspection inside.

Observed

Portals, roads, a security wall, vehicle activity, excavated spoil, reinforcement and partial backfilling.

Assessed

Likely depth, hall size, the role of ventilation and the stage of construction.

Unknown

The interior plan, contents, operational status and the real effect of a strike on underground halls.

01 · A MAP FILLED IN OVER SIX YEARS

One mountain, two complexes and infrastructure that became gradually legible from orbit

The schematic preserves the relative positions described in commercial imagery analysis. It does not reproduce an interior plan or draw unseen tunnels. Select a year to see what had become observable at the surface.

02 · HOW MUCH ROCK IS ABOVE IT?

Three public estimates describe different geometries

The interior has no public map. Estimates use portal elevations, the mountain ridge and the volume of excavated earth. They converge on a very deep site, but do not locate the halls precisely or reveal whether the tunnels rise or descend.

A separate analysis based on excavated spoil piles and Planet Labs imagery estimated a depth of 80–100 m. The method does not reveal the exact shape of underground cavities.

The three values should not be averaged. The first two start from terrain and elevation; the third starts from excavation. All carry substantial uncertainty.

03 · THE BOMB AND THE MOUNTAIN USE DIFFERENT UNITS

The GBU-57 is America’s heaviest conventional penetrating bomb. Its real performance remains classified

The Air Force describes the Massive Ordnance Penetrator as a 30,000-pound weapon for hard and deeply buried targets. An older public caption says it was designed to penetrate up to 200 feet, about 61 metres, before exploding. That number is not a universal guarantee: rock, concrete, impact angle, fuzing and repeated strikes change the result. Reuters reports that experts assess the Pickaxe complexes as beyond the reliable reach of the most powerful US bunker-busting bombs.

13.6 ttotal mass, approximate
6.25 mlength
2.4 texplosive fill, approximate
61 mold public “up to” figure

Why 61 m versus 80–100 m remains an incomplete comparison

  • The weapon figure describes penetration under specific conditions, while operational details are classified.
  • The mountain figure describes rock above an estimated position, not necessarily the direct path to a hall.
  • A strike can cause shock, local collapse or access denial without the weapon physically reaching the hall.

04 · WHAT DOES “TAKE IT OUT” MEAN IN MILITARY TERMS?

Four thresholds for success. Each leaves a different facility behind and requires different proof

Choose a threshold. The mountain section shows which part of the system is affected, what a satellite could see and how easily the effect could be reversed. A public claim of “destruction” is hard to assess without the threshold being defined.

05 · THE EVIDENCE LEDGER

What is observed, what is assessed and what remains open to speculation

The filters separate visible or declared facts from analytical inference and genuine gaps. The distinction matters because the same image can prove there is a construction site without proving an active enrichment plant.

Observed / documented

Two separate complexes

The large complex begun in 2020 and the smaller facility known since 2007 are physically distinct and sit inside the expanded perimeter.

Observed / documented

Four portals for the new complex

Imagery shows a pair of entrances on the eastern side and a pair on the western side of the mountain.

Observed / documented

Iran announced a centrifuge hall

In September 2020, Iran’s nuclear chief said a larger, more modern hall would be built in the mountain after the surface facility was destroyed.

Observed / documented

Work continued in 2026

Analysis of April, May and late-June imagery described vehicles, reinforcement at entrances and continuing construction.

Assessed

Likely depth exceeds many conventional targets

Public estimates put the facility about 80–100 m deep or in a geometry that may provide even more local rock cover.

Assessed

An enrichment plant remains possible

The size and protection of the complex could permit functions beyond centrifuge assembly. There is no public confirmation by inspection.

Assessed

The large complex still appeared non-operational

The June 2026 Institute for Science and International Security assessment described ongoing construction and did not consider the facilities ready to operate.

Unknown

No public interior plan exists

The position, number and size of halls, tunnel gradients and connections between galleries are not publicly known.

Unknown

The contents of the smaller complex are unknown

The older tunnels were observed sealed. Any material inside has not been identified publicly.

Unknown

The uranium stockpile has not been publicly placed at Pickaxe

The IAEA could not verify the location of the full stockpile after the 2025 war. The June 2026 assessment said the large Pickaxe complex was not believed to hold it.

No claim matches the selected filter.

06 · HOW THE MOUNTAIN BECAME A TARGET

A chronology of hardening, distrust and escalation

Pickaxe Mountain began as a response to the vulnerability of a surface hall. Every later episode added physical protection and political uncertainty.

2007

A smaller complex becomes publicly known

Analysts identify older tunnels south of Natanz. Iran does not declare them as a nuclear facility and the IAEA does not inspect them.

02.07.2020

The Natanz explosion destroys the assembly hall

On 2 July, a building used for advanced centrifuge assembly is heavily damaged. Iran later describes the incident as sabotage.

09.2020

Iran moves the successor into the mountain

In September, Ali Akbar Salehi announces a more modern, wider and more comprehensive hall in the mountain near Natanz. Visible work begins that autumn.

2022

The geometry looks larger and deeper

Four entrances to the new complex appear. Elevation analysis suggests protection comparable to or greater than Fordow.

2024

Possible ventilation infrastructure appears

Work on the slope points to a possible ventilation shaft, needed for people, machinery and clean assembly spaces.

04.2025

The mountain gains a double perimeter

Walls, fences and patrol roads extend physical protection and connect the area to Natanz security.

22.06.2025

The US strikes Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan

Operation Midnight Hammer uses 14 GBU-57 bombs against two target areas and Tomahawk missiles against Isfahan. Pickaxe Mountain is not struck.

2026

Portals are reinforced and partly backfilled

Imagery shows concrete, heavy machinery and defensive work. In April and May, eastern access is restricted with earth while western entrances remain open.

13.07.2026

Trump promises a strike

On 13 July, the US president says America will “take out” Pickaxe Mountain and suggests an attack is near.

07 · WHY IT MATTERS EVEN IF THE SITE IS EMPTY

Strategic value comes from future capacity, unverified stocks and the cost of uncertainty

The large complex was not assessed as operational in June 2026. That reduces the case for an immediate threat from inside it, while leaving the broader stakes intact. A nearly finished facility could shelter equipment, production or storage. The absence of IAEA access makes it hard to distinguish defensive preparation from undeclared nuclear activity.

A strike can destroy future capacity

If the halls are empty, the main effect is the loss of hard-to-build infrastructure rather than the interruption of enrichment already under way.

A blocked portal can obstruct verification too

Isolating the interior can delay Iranian operations and also delay inspectors who might establish what survived.

Uncertainty creates pressure for repeated strikes

Without plans, interior sensors or inspections, any vehicle movement can be read as reconstruction. The ambiguity favours escalation and claims that cannot be checked quickly.

Nuclear knowledge is not stored in one mountain

Destroying a facility can remove equipment and delay a programme. Personnel, designs and industrial experience remain distributed.

08 · WHAT TO WATCH AFTER A STRIKE

The first images would show access. Certainty about the interior would arrive much later

These indicators can test public claims without pretending a satellite can see through a mountain.

Portals and roads

Craters, collapse, fresh earth and excavator tracks would show whether access was blocked or reopened.

Power and ventilation

Transformers, power lines, chillers and slope structures indicate whether support functions can return.

Surface deformation

Subsidence, cracking or terrain change can suggest internal collapse. Their absence does not prove the halls are intact.

Activity in the following weeks

Vehicle tempo, rubble removal and new entrances would measure Iran’s ability to recover.

IAEA and radiological data

Iranian notifications, inspector access and radiation monitoring would clarify whether nuclear material was present.

SOURCES AND CLAIM STATUS

Public documents, commercial imagery and explicit limits

Surface facts come mainly from analysis of commercial imagery. Depth and internal functions are estimates. Claims about strike effects remain scenarios until supported by post-strike data, technical information or inspection.

Status note: there is no public confirmation of the interior plan, an active enrichment facility or uranium storage in the large Pickaxe complex. Analytical assessments are identified as such. The last-check time appears in the hero because the military situation can change quickly.